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1. Introduction 
How do incumbent parties attempt to enhance their re-election prospects through fiscal 
policies? Do they manipulate the overall levels of public spending and revenue or reallocate 
their components while not necessarily changing the total levels? And what political 
considerations might explain the occurrence and magnitude of such opportunistic fiscal 
manipulations? 
 To address these questions, we assemble a new and more comprehensive dataset on 
disaggregated expenditure and revenue series than any other prior study. This novel dataset, 
which covers around 100 countries over the period 1975-2010, enables us to shed new light on 
the electoral effects on governments’ fiscal policy conducts at the national level. Importantly, 
to highlight circumstances under which fiscal manipulations may occur, we condition our 
analyses on various political considerations. They are categorized as follows: 1) those affecting 
the readiness and incentives of incumbent politicians to behave opportunistically, such as the 
degrees of fragmentation of governments and competitiveness of elections; 2) those affecting 
the efficacy of the opportunistic measures to yield additional votes, such as the maturity of 
democracy and the degree to which voters are informed; and 3) characteristics of political 
institutions, such as presidential versus parliamentary democracies, and proportional versus 
majoritarian electoral rules.  
Our key findings are as follows. First, while a pre-electoral rise in the deficit is observed 
under different political conditions, such as when elections are close, voters are less informed, 
democracy is not matured, and electoral systems are proportional, this rise in deficits is 
predominantly driven by a rise in the current, not capital, component of spending, and a fall in 
taxes, often in the form of income taxes. Second, under established democracies in particular, 
elections cause reallocations within expenditure and revenue, without their total levels 
changed. Specifically, in these democracies, central governments tend to increase grants to 
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other government units (OGU), a particular subcomponent in current spending, while reducing 
capital spending. They also reduce income taxes, while increasing consumption taxes instead. 
To further clarify this paper’s contribution to the literature, we here highlight how it 
adds to three closely related works on the electoral effects on fiscal policy composition at the 
national level. First, while Brender and Drazen (2013) also disaggregate public spending in 
detail (albeit following functional, instead of economic, classifications) and also condition 
electoral effects on several political factors, their use of a composition index1 does not allow 
one to identify what exact spending components change. We add to their analyses by 
clarifying between which spending components reallocations may take place and also by 
examining the electoral effects on public revenue composition as well. Second, although 
Ehrhart (2013) investigates the electoral effects on the composition of tax revenue, her focus is 
on the distinction between direct and indirect taxes, thus not examining the effects on 
different types of taxes separately.2 Moreover, since her analyses focus on developing 
countries, the coverage is not suitable to highlight the roles of political factors in 
mature/established of democracies. Third, while Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) do consider 
electoral effects both on the expenditure and revenue composition at the central government 
level, they only study OECD countries, thus confining the analysis to developed, established 
democracies. Moreover, unlike our analyses, they do not examine the effects on 
subcomponents within current spending and direct taxation.3 In short, we add to the current 
state of the literature by making use of a highly disaggregated spending and revenue dataset 
which covers a large number of countries with diverse political characteristics. 
                                                          
1
 Specifically, using information on the breakdown of central government expenditure for a sample 
covering 71 democracies over the period 1972–2009, they construct an index of expenditure 
composition which measures the change in the functional expenditure composition in a given country 
between year t and year t-n, from any category to another, taking no stand on the direction of the 
change. 
2
 Specifically, direct taxation, in her analysis, corresponds only to income taxes, while indirect taxation is 
a composite of international trade and consumption taxes. 
3
 Their definition of direct (distortionary) taxation is a composite of various taxes such as income, 
property, and payroll taxes. 
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a literature review of the 
studies of electoral effects on fiscal policy conduct, mainly at the central government level. 
Section 3 describes the dataset used in the empirical analyses. Section 4 explains the 
methodology implemented in the subsequent empirical work, and section 5 presents the 
results. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Elections and opportunistic fiscal policy conduct: a literature review 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) show that before elections, incumbent politicians may engage in 
opportunistic expansionary fiscal policies to increase their chances of re-election, by reducing 
taxes (immediately visible to the electorate) financed through seigniorage (observable with a 
lag) and thus generating budget cycles. Subsequently, Rogoff (1990) extends the analysis to 
pre-electoral manipulation of public spending composition, suggesting that opportunistic 
incumbents may attempt to signal their competence to the electorate, by shifting spending 
towards (immediately observed) consumption expenditure from investment expenditure 
(visible only after the election). Following these seminal contributions, several studies 
examined PBCs, although a smaller number of works directly highlighted the compositional 
changes (rather than changes in the overall levels) of expenditures and revenues at the central 
government level.4 In what follows, we review the literature, focusing on factors affecting the 
existence and extent of politicians’ opportunistic behavior, and identify possible gaps.5 
 
2.1. Factors affecting the readiness and incentives of politicians to act opportunistically 
For incumbents to manipulate fiscal policies, certain conditions often need to be satisfied. One 
crucial condition is the predictability of the timing of elections. Some studies, using panels of 
                                                          
4
 Studies of electoral effects on the composition of fiscal policy tools at the subnational level are 
abundant. Examples include Khemani (2004) (for Indian states), Veiga and Veiga (2007) (for Portuguese 
municipalities), Drazen and Eslava (2010) (for Columbian municipalities), and Sjahrir et al. (2013) (for 
Indonesian districts).  
5
 For a survey on conditional budget cycles see de Haan and Klomp (2013). 
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countries, suggest that PBCs are more prevalent in samples including only predetermined 
elections; that is, elections held in the last year of a constitutionally fixed term for the 
legislature or executive (e.g., Shi and Svensson (2006) and Efthyvoulou (2012)). The 
fragmentation of the government appears to be another key factor, affecting the ability of 
politicians to implement their most preferred policies. Regarding this point, Chang (2008) finds 
that in OECD countries, fiscal policy manipulation during elections is constrained when 
policymaking power is dispersed among multiple veto players.6  
Turning to factors affecting the incumbents’ incentives to generate PBCs, Efthyvoulou 
(2012), using data for EU member countries from 1997 to 2008, emphasizes the importance of 
electoral competitiveness on politicians’ incentives to generate PBC.7,8 Also, changes in 
ideology may affect politicians’ incentive to engage in PBCs. Alesina and Tabbellini (1990) 
indicate that spending and deficits increase before elections when politicians expect to be 
replaced by an opponent with a different ideology, to limit the options of the newly elected 
candidate.9 Finally, the level of rents extracted in office is also likely to influence the incentives 
to remain in power and, thus, the incentive for incumbents to engage in electoral fiscal 
manipulations. In this regard, Shi and Svensson (2006) argue that one of the reasons for PBCs 
to be larger in developing than in developed countries is that politicians in developing 
countries gain more private benefits when in power than incumbents in developed countries. 
As for the electoral effects on expenditure composition, a few works focus on 
developing countries in particular, possibly because weaker institutions render fiscal 
                                                          
6
 Veto players are actors whose agreement is necessary for changing an existing policy. They can be 
political parties in a coalition or political organs that have formal veto powers. The larger the number of 
veto players and the ideological differences among them, the more difficult it is to change the status 
quo. 
7
 This factor was already a focus of the preceding `political business cycle’ literature starting in the 
1970s. For instance, Frey and Schneider (1978a, 1978b) argue that when the election is competitive and 
incumbents are in danger of losing, they have a larger incentive to adopt expansionary policies before 
elections to stimulate the economy. 
8
 At the local government level in Portugal, Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011), taking into account the 
interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory, show that 
incumbents behave more opportunistically when they expect elections to be more competitive. 
9
 Partisan cycles were described by Hibbs (1997). For a survey of the impact of ideology on categories of 
public spending and revenues see Franzese (2002). 
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manipulation more practicable. However, results of these studies are not always consistent. 
For instance, Schuknecht (2000) argues public capital projects are more easily manipulated in 
developing countries than current expenditures are, which is frequently based on long term 
commitments,10 whereas Block (2002) shows that the share of capital spending in total 
spending falls in election years, confirming the theoretical prediction that electoral incentives 
lead to an increase in more visible forms of public expenditure at the expense of less visible 
forms. Meanwhile, Ehrhart (2013) examines electoral effects on tax revenue composition, 
showing a fall in indirect taxes prior to elections in a sample of developing countries.  
 
2.2. Factors affecting the efficacy of opportunistic behavior to generating additional votes 
While certain conditions may render incumbents’ fiscal manipulations possible, it also matters 
whether or not such an action is likely to yield additional votes. For instance, Shi and Svensson 
(2006) argued that PBCs might be larger in developing than in developed countries may be 
because in the latter countries there is a larger share of informed voters, making fiscal policy 
manipulations less effective. Further, Brender and Drazen (2005) emphasize the importance of 
the maturity of democracy, showing that PBCs are more important in new, rather than 
established, democracies. This is presumably because if voters are inexperienced with 
electoral manipulations or lack the information needed to evaluate them, opportunistic 
measures are expected to gain their support more effectively.11 Following this argument 
Brender and Drazen (2013), using a panel of 71 democracies, present evidence for election-
year effects on the composition, rather than on the level, of expenditure under established 
                                                          
10
 Vergone (2009) also reports evidence of a shift from current expenditure to capital expenditure in 
pre-election periods. 
11
 Although Alt and Lassen (2006) argue that fiscal electoral cycles are not confined to or driven by 
weaker and newer democracies, they also show that even among advanced democracies, opportunistic 
electoral cycles appear where budget institutions are less transparent, indicating the importance of 
information availability to voters for fiscal manipulations. 
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democracies.12 In line with their result, Katsimi and Sarantides (2012), focusing on a panel of 
19 OECD countries (thus, established democracies), show that particularly for predetermined 
electoral periods, current expenditure increases at the expense of capital expenditure, while 
there is no evidence for an increase in total expenditure or the deficit.13 
 
2.3. Characteristics of political institutions 
Finally, Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000, 2003) emphasize the role of political institutions in 
shaping PBCs, focusing on electoral rules (single versus multiple-district elections) and the 
system of government (presidential versus parliamentary democracies). They argue that 
presidential democracies are less subject to political rent extraction than parliamentary 
democracies, and therefore, to smaller PBC. As for electoral rules, they also argue that 
proportional electoral systems are more susceptible to budgetary manipulation, because 
incumbents need to please one half of the voters there, while in majoritarian systems they 
only need to please roughly one fourth (half the voters in half the districts). Furthermore, in 
proportional systems, incentives for good individual performance by a politician may be 
diluted because citizens vote on a list and, consequently, elections are a less powerful tool to 
discipline them. 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) also shed light on how electoral rules may affect 
expenditure composition. Specifically, they show that only under proportional elections, is 
there a significant pre-election spending increase, particularly in welfare spending (which 
targets a broad population group). Likewise, Chang (2008), focusing on OECD countries, also 
shows that before elections, incumbents increase social welfare spending under proportional 
                                                          
12
 They also consider the post-election development in expenditure composition. In particular, using an 
index of changes in the composition of central government expenditures, they conclude that leadership 
changes do not influence the composition of expenditures in the first two years of the term, but they 
result in greater compositional changes over a four-year period, particularly in developed countries. 
13
 However, they suggest that total revenue may decrease, driven by a fall in direct taxation. 
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representation, while they raise district-specific spending (including infrastructure investments 
such as construction and transport spending) under plurality (majoritarian) rules. 
 
2.4. Identifying gaps in the literature 
While various features of the political environment have been shown to be relevant to the 
occurrence of PBCs, it is not always clear which exact expenditure/revenue components are 
manipulated under those conditions. Further, while there is evidence that reallocations of 
spending and/or revenue occur under some circumstances, including established democracies, 
there is still room to explore the nature of reallocations more carefully, for example, by 
elaborating on which spending/revenue components those reallocations may occur. The 
present paper attempts to fill these gaps, using a newly-assembled dataset explained below.  
 
3. The dataset 
In what follows, we explain how we assemble a panel dataset covering central governments’ 
expenditure and revenue series, elections and other political variables, and other control 
variables (including macroeconomic series), for more than 100 countries, over the period 
1975-2010.14  
 
3.1. Public finances 
We assemble a public finance dataset at the central government level, based on the IMF's 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS) yearbook. A key innovation of this dataset is to bridge 
major methodological changes in the GFS manual (GFSM). These changes were implemented 
from the mid-1990s to the early-2000s, with the introduction of GFSM2001, which replaced 
the older GFSM1986. In essence, we retrieve all historical spending and revenue data available 
for all countries that have reported data to the GFS yearbook for the 1975-2010 period, and 
                                                          
14
 The descriptive statistics of all variables used in the estimations are reported in Table A.1, in the 
Appendix. 
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then assemble comparable data series of expenditure and revenue at the level of 
disaggregation we pursue, referring to Wickens (2002), who details the methodological 
differences between the two manuals.15  
We here describe some of the key differences across the two methodologies and how 
we have attempted to deal with them. First, the way total expenditure and revenue are 
classified is different, particularly for the expenditure. For example, while we disaggregate 
expenditure following economic classifications, the exact definition of `current’ and `capital’ 
concepts are different between the manuals. Specifically, the capital expenditure concept 
under GFSM2001, denoted as `net acquisition of non-financial assets’ deducts the sales of 
fixed capital assets from the acquisition of such assets, while the concept under GFSM1986 
does not. Further, while capital transfers are part of capital expenditure under GFSM1986, 
they are included as a current expenditure, denoted as `expense’, under GFSM2001. 
Acknowledging such differences in classifications (as clarified in Wickens (2002)), we have 
converted all of the available items under GFSM1986 into the concepts defined by GFSM2001, 
for not only the expenditure, but for revenue series as well. 
Second, the two methodologies differ in terms of the way statistics are reported. In 
particular, while under GFSM1986, reporting is on a cash basis, under GFSM2001, it is, in 
principle, on an accrual basis.16 This also presents some challenges. For example, the accrual 
concept of `consumption of fixed capital’, a subcomponent in `expense’ under GFSM2001, 
representing a decline in the value of government’s fixed assets due to physical deterioration, 
obsolescence, or accidental damages, does not exist in the GFSM1986 cash system. This 
implies that capital spending concepts under GFSM1986 and GFSM2001 are still not 
consistent, with the former not deducting `depreciation’ of capital. To deal with this, for the 
                                                          
15
 Disaggregated public spending and revenue datasets were assembled along the same lines by, 
respectively, Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) and Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012). The 
former focuses on the effects of the composition of spending on economic growth, while the latter 
studies the effects of tax composition. Our dataset combines spending and revenue components, 
including also budget deficits and a wide set of political, economic and institutional variables. 
16
 This is `in principle’, because under GFSM2001, some reporting is still done following a cash basis.  
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data originally retrieved from GFSM2001, we move (i.e., add) consumption of fixed capital to 
the capital spending component, so that the modified capital spending component becomes 
comparable to the one from GFSM1986, i.e., without depreciation subtracted. However, in 
general, fundamental differences between the cash and accrual systems prevail, including the 
fact that the timing of reporting also differs.17 Thus, it is important to acknowledge that the 
unification of the data series is not exact, but approximate.   
Last, a few comments on the institutional coverage of the government are in order. 
While this paper’s focus is fiscal policy conducts at the central government (CG) level, it is 
possible to create subsectors at this level of government, based on how the units are financed, 
i.e., by the legislative budgets or by extrabudgetary sources. In an attempt to maximize our 
sample size, we supplement consolidated CG data with budgetary CG (i.e., the CG unit based 
only on the legislative budget) data.18 
 
3.2. Democracy 
The variable POLITY2 from the 2012 version of the Polity IV database (see Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2009) is used to identify democracies. This polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). As in Brender and Drazen (2013), we only consider 
democracies in our dataset, that is, values of POLITY2 from zero to 10. In the case of 
new/recent democracies, the year of the switch from negative to zero or positive values of 
POLITY2 is used as the reference for the beginning of democracy in the respective country. 19 
                                                          
17
 In the accrual system, flows are recorded at the time economic value is created, transferred, or 
extinguished, while with the cash basis, flows are recorded when cash is received or paid.  
18
 Specifically, while we primarily use data at the consolidated CG level, we use budgetary CG data only 
when no single observation for the budget deficit is available for a country at the consolidated level for 
the entire 1975-2010 period. Importantly, being aware that differences between consolidated and 
budgetary CG data can be not trivial, we never mix these data over time. 
19
 Despite its widespread use, the POLITY2 variable has received some criticism, as similar scores may be 
attributed to different situations. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) argue that using a specific score 
of POLITY2 to identify democracies may not be the best choice, and propose an alternative measure. 
The fixed effects results for all democracies and all elections, when using their democracy dummy 
variable, are shown in Table A.2 (in the Appendix). They are very similar to those reported in Table 1a. 
The same applies to the system-GMM estimations of Table 1b and to the estimations of the remaining 
10 
 
The number of elections/years from then on determines when a new democracy becomes an 
established democracy (as in Brender and Drazen, 2005).20 
 
3.3. Election data 
Data on the elections, since 1975, for the chief executive are from the 2012 version of the 
Database of Political Institutions – DPI (see Beck et al., 2001). Presidential elections are 
considered for presidential systems (SYSTEM=0), while legislative elections are used for 
parliamentary systems and when the president is not elected by universal suffrage. We 
construct two election-year variables commonly used in the literature, based on information 
on the year and month of the elections:21  
 Election_year: dummy variable which takes the value of one in the election year, and 
equals zero otherwise. 
 Election_year2: equals m/12 in the election year, (1-m/12) in the year before, and zero 
in the remaining years, where m is the month of the election (January=1 to 
December=12). 
 
3.4. Other political variables 
Data from the DPI is also used to distinguish proportional representation electoral systems 
from majoritarian ones and presidential systems from parliamentary ones. Several other 
variables, related to ideology, shares of votes/seats, fractionalization, polarization, checks and 
balances, etc. are also obtained from the DPI. Other political variables used include the Heinisz 
                                                                                                                                                                          
tables (results not shown here, but available upon request). Thus, the main conclusions of the paper 
hold if the democracy variable of Cheibub et al. (2010) is used instead of POLITY2. 
20
 The identification of established and new democracies using POLITY2 and the democracy dummy of 
Cheibub et al. (2010) leads to similar results. In fact, the correlation between the dummy variables 
constructed for established and new democracies are, respectively, 0.92 and 0.97. 
21
 The variables EXELEC and LEGELEC from DPI were used to determine the year in which each election 
occurred, while the variables DATEEXE, and DATELEG, also from DPI, were used to identify the month. 
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(2000) index of political constraints and an institutional index built along the lines of that of Shi 
and Svensson (2006), using data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
 
3.5. Main control variables 
We include in all our estimations a set of control variables (those used in Brender and Drazen, 
2005) which may affect the behavior and composition of public finances: 
 Log of GDP per capita at 2005 constant US dollars: obtained from the World 
Development Indicators – WDI (World Bank). This variable controls for the income 
level of the countries. 
 Trade (% GDP): sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP (also from the 
WDI). This variable controls for the effects of trade openness on public finances. 
 Output gap: logarithmic difference between real GDP and its trend (obtained using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter). Data for the real GDP is from the World Economic Outlook 
(IMF). The output gap controls for the effects of business cycles on public finances. 
 Percentages of the population below 15 and above 65 years old: These demographic 
variables were obtained from the WDI and control for the effects of demography on 
public finances. 
 Trend and Trend squared: To control for the passage of time.22 
 
4. Empirical methodology  
The empirical model can be summarized as follows: 
𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁    𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇𝑖 (1) 
                                                          
22
 Although we also considered the option of using year dummy variables, the problem is that, with 36 
years of observations, their inclusion greatly increases the number of instruments in system-GMM 
estimations. In fact, for those estimations where a lower number of countries is available, the number of 
instruments is sometimes higher than the number of countries, which is likely to make the instrument 
matrix invalid. Thus, although the results are very similar in general, we preferred to take time effects 
into consideration through the inclusion of a quadratic time trend. We report in Table A.3 (in the 
Appendix) the results obtained when using year dummies in Fixed Effects estimations. These are 
practically equal to those obtained when using a quadratic time trend (see Table 1a). 
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where fit is a fiscal variable in country i in year t and p is its number of lags included in the 
model, ELECTit is an electoral variable,
23 Xit is a vector of control variables (including a quadratic 
time trend), μi is the effect of country i, εit is the error term, and α,  and δ are parameters or 
vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
The estimation of this linear dynamic panel data model using OLS would be biased, 
since the lagged dependent variable is endogenous to the country effects. OLS estimation will 
be inconsistent, even assuming fixed or random effects, because the lagged dependent 
variable is correlated with the error term, even if the latter is not serially correlated (see 
Arellano and Bond, 1991). This bias becomes smaller as the number of periods increases, but 
Judson and Owen (1999) found that the bias of the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
approach can be notable, even when the time dimension of the panel is as large as 30. 
However, using an RMSE criterion, the LSDV performs just as well or better than many 
alternatives when T=30. Given that our dataset covers a 36-year period, it could be safe to 
simply estimate a fixed effects model. However, when we do that, our panel is unbalanced, 
and that the average number of observations per country in most regressions is around 20. 
Thus, the fixed effects model may still suffer from dynamic panel bias. 
Following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized 
Method of Moments (difference-GMM) estimator that solves the problems mentioned above 
by taking first differences of equation (1) and instrumenting predetermined and endogenous 
variables with their available lags in levels. But, when taking first differences, the cross-
sectional relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables is lost. Furthermore, 
as shown by Blundell and Bond (1998), lagged levels may be weak instruments for first-
differences if the series are persistent. According to Arellano and Bover (1995), efficiency can 
                                                          
23
 In estimations for the first electoral variable, we also tried the inclusion of its lagged value, in order to 
capture opportunistic effects that may happen in the year before elections. In general, when the 
electoral variable and its lag are included at the same time, only the contemporaneous value is 
statistically significant. Thus, the electoral manipulation of fiscal variables tends to occur closer to 
elections. These results are not shown here but are available from the authors upon request. 
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be improved by adding the original equation in levels to the system, that is, by using the 
system-GMM estimator which combines the first-differenced and levels equations. 
When estimating system-GMM models, we take into account the possibility that fiscal 
variables affect macroeconomic performance. Thus, we treat GDP per capita, trade and the 
output gap as endogenous variables. When there are several endogenous variables in a model, 
the number of instruments can easily become very large, leading to over-fitting of the data 
which can bias t-statistics upwards. In order to avoid this problem, and having in mind the fact 
that more distant lags are usually weak instruments, we limit the lag length to that strictly 
necessary to have a valid instrument matrix.24 Since Hansen tests never reject the validity of 
the instrument matrix and second order autocorrelation is always rejected, supporting the 
validity of our results. Furthermore, Difference-in-Hansen tests do not reject the validity of the 
subsets of instruments. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Unconditional electoral effects on fiscal policies 
We start by estimating the model described in the previous section for all democracies, 
without conditioning on the political considerations listed above. Tables 1a and 1b, using the 
fixed effects (FE)25 and the system-GMM method, respectively, summarize the estimation 
results for all revenue and expenditure components (as percentages of GDP), and for the 
budget deficit.26 Those for system-GMM are the two-step results, using robust standard errors 
                                                          
24
 The baseline specification uses lags 2 and 3 of the fiscal variables and of the other endogenous 
variables as instruments in the first-differenced equations (the collapse option of the xtabond2 Stata 
command is used to avoid an excessive number of instruments) and their once-lagged first-differences 
are used in the levels equation. The exogenous variables are used as their own instruments. The lag 
structure was adjusted when the baseline specification mentioned above did not pass all Hansen and 
difference-in-Hansen tests. 
25
 In order to avoid endogeneity/simultaneity problem in FE estimations, all control variables were 
lagged one period. 
26
 As listed in Table A.1 (in the Appendix), we analyzed the central government total revenue series, and 
its components: taxes, social contributions, grants and other revenues. The subcomponents of revenue 
taxes (income taxes, taxes on payroll, property taxes, consumption taxes, and international taxes) were 
also investigated. Regarding expenditures, we looked at the total, current and capital expenditure 
14 
 
corrected for finite samples. T-statistics are presented in parentheses and the degree of 
statistical significance is signaled with asterisks. The number of instruments and the results of 
AR(1), AR(2), Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests for system-GMM and the adjusted R-
squared for FE are reported at the foot of the table, as well as the number of observations and 
countries.  
[Insert Tables 1a and 1b around here] 
As Tables 1a and 1b show, the first lag of the dependent variable is always statistically 
significant, demonstrating that there is persistence in all fiscal series. For Total Revenue and 
Taxes, there is clear evidence of electoral manipulation of central governments’ revenues, 
regardless of the estimation method used (FE or system-GMM). Specifically, during election 
years, total revenue is estimated to fall from 0.28 to 0.31 percentage points of GDP. Among 
the components of taxes, income taxes exhibit a similar behavior. There is also marginal 
evidence of a rise in total expenditure during electoral periods, albeit only with FE. In terms of 
its components, current expenditure, and within it grants to OGU, appear to increase; 
however, capital expenditure may actually fall.27 Results also suggest the occurrence of an 
opportunistic budget cycle, as the budget deficit increases in election years.  
Turning to the control variables, the log of GDP per capita at 2005 constant US dollars, 
used to control for the income level of the countries, is statistically significant in only two 
system-GMM regressions (for total and current expenditure), while trade as a percentage of 
GDP is never statistically significant. Regarding the demographic variables, the percentage of 
population below 15 years old seems to exert a negative impact on total taxes and income 
                                                                                                                                                                          
series, as well as their components. Current expenditure includes six components: compensation of 
employees, use of goods and services, interest, subsidies, social benefits, and grants. The latter is 
divided into grants abroad and grants to OGU. 
27
 It is worth noting that, working with local government fiscal data, Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Drazen 
and Eslava (2010) found clearer evidence of electoral increases in capital expenditure in Portugal and 
Colombia, respectively, than in current expenditure. It is possible that these different results are due to 
specific characteristics of the countries analyzed or of fiscal policy at the local government level. 
Regarding the latter, local governments’ investments are generally of smaller magnitude than central 
government ones, which implies that they can be executed faster and are thus easier to use 
opportunistically than large central government capital expenditure. 
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taxes (FE results) and positive effects on current and total expenditure (system GMM), while 
the percentage of population above 65 years has a similar impact on total taxes and income 
taxes (FE results) and a positive impact on total revenue (system GMM). Current and total 
expenditure are the most sensitive to the output gap. In FE estimations, there is also evidence 
of a positive trend in taxes and of a U-shaped trend in expenditure items and the budget 
deficit, while there is no evidence of time effects in system-GMM regressions. 
 
5.2. Conditional electoral effects on fiscal policies 
We now examine electoral effects on central governments’ fiscal behavior by conditioning 
their occurrence and magnitude on various political institutions. Importantly, these analyses 
help us identify critical conditions which may prompt politicians to take opportunistic fiscal 
measures, thus shedding further light on the results from Tables 1a and 1b. As in the literature 
review, we organize the possible conditions under the headings of (1) factors that influence 
the readiness and incentives of incumbents to act opportunistically, (2) factors that affect the 
efficacy of opportunistic policies to generate additional votes, and (3) characteristics of 
political institutions. Specifically, we interact the two electoral variables described above with 
dummy variables that proxy those political considerations, for both system-GMM and fixed 
effects estimations. Although we have examined the roles of all the factors reviewed above, 
we describe below only the results where the impacts are robust across estimation techniques, 
particularly regarding the electoral effects on the expenditure/revenue composition.  
All the following regressions are estimated over samples in which election dates were 
predetermined, rather than for the entire sample including all elections (in Tables 1a and 1b). 
The purpose is to avoid the potential problem of endogeneity of the election dates, as well as 
to focus on the cases in which incumbents can predict the timing of the next election, ensuring 
their readiness to implement opportunistic measures. According to Sjahrir et al. (2013), the 
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exogeneity of the election dates and the different timing of elections across countries provide 
a clear identification of the political budget cycles.28 
 
Electoral competitiveness 
First, to consider the electoral role of the degree of competitiveness of the elections, which is 
expected to affect the incentive of incumbents to act opportunistically, we interact the 
electoral variables with dummy variables for close and less-close elections. Specifically, 
elections are defined as close if the difference in vote shares between the major government 
and opposition parties (or candidates, in presidential elections) is smaller than 10 percentage 
points.29  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
The results reported in Table 2 (where only the coefficients for the interactions are 
shown for brevity) indicate that the election year tends to be associated with a rise in budget 
deficits, particularly when elections are close, primarily driven by a fall in total revenue, rather 
than by a rise in total expenditure. However, when examining the components of expenditure, 
notice that close elections are associated with a rise in current spending, while capital 
spending appears to fall. Further, when investigating the subcomponents of current spending, 
system-GMM results give some indication that it may be driven by a rise in grants, particularly 
ones to OGU. Turning to revenue components, overall taxes fall, which is apparently caused by 
a reduction in income taxes.30 We obtain similar results when performing estimations on a 
sample including only close/competitive elections (see Table A.4 in the Appendix). 
                                                          
28
 The identification is clearer than when all elections take place at the same time, as happens with 
subnational elections in many countries. In those cases, the PBC may coincide with other time effects. In 
this paper, time effects, common to all countries, are accounted for by including a quadratic time trend. 
As indicated above, using year dummies instead does not significantly change the results. 
29
 Using a margin of 5 points yields similar results. 
30
 Bracco, Porcelli and Redoano (2013) argue that, when electoral competition is high, incumbent policy 
makers replace more salient taxes with the less salient ones. Using data for Italian local elections, they 
present evidence that in more competitive elections, mayors reduce (more salient) property taxes and 
instead increase (less salient) fees for services such as parking permits and planning permissions. 
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Informed voters 
Next, we turn to the extent to which voters are informed, as a factor affecting the efficacy of 
politicians’ opportunistic behavior generating additional votes. Following Shi and Svenson 
(2006), we create an index of media diffusion (IMD), which combines information on the 
freedom of broadcast (using the Freedom House data on the freedom of the press) with the 
number of radios per capita (taken from the Cross National Time Series database – CNTS).31 
Then, we interact the electoral variables with dummy variables for high and low IMD (above 
and below the 75th percentile).  
 [Insert Table 3 around here] 
Table 3 shows that as expected, there is evidence of budget cycles, particularly when 
voters are not well informed, i.e., when the index of media diffusion takes low values. 
Moreover, notice that, while total expenditure itself appears to rise, this is critically driven by a 
rise in current spending, while capital spending falls. Disaggregating current spending further, 
FE results suggest that an increase in grants to OGU, in particular, may contribute to a rise in 
this spending. As for the electoral effects on revenue when voters are not well informed, a 
pattern similar to that of close elections (see Table 2) is observed. That is, a fall in total 
revenue appears to be driven by a fall in taxes, in particular, income taxes.32 
 
Maturity of democracy 
We now take into account the maturity of democracy, another factor thought to affect the 
efficacy of incumbents’ opportunistic behavior. We do so by interacting the electoral variables 
with dummy variables for established and new democracies. As in Brender and Drazen (2005), 
                                                          
31
 Using the Freedom House data on the freedom of broadcast, we assign the classifications of Free, 
Partially Free and Not Free broadcast the numerical values of 2, 1 and 0, respectively. Then, the index of 
media diffusion (IMD) is obtained by multiplying this series by that of the number of radios per capita. 
Finally, we defined as high IMD the values above or equal to the 75
th
 percentile. 
32
 The results obtained for a sample restricted to the observations in which the IMD is low are reported 
in Table A.5, in the Appendix. As seen there, the results are consistent with the ones based on the 
interaction approach. 
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democracies are classified as established if they were democratic during the entire sample 
period and the ten years preceding the start of the sample period,33 and the remaining 
countries are classified as new democracies during their first four democratic elections.34  
 [Insert Table 4 around here] 
In accordance with the Brender-Drazen results, Table 4 reveals no evidence of 
opportunistic behavior in total expenditure or total revenue in established democracies, while 
in new democracies there is evidence of lower total revenue and higher total expenditures 
and, thus, of budget deficits. Turning to the components of expenditure and revenue, the 
results suggest that a rise in total expenditure in new democracies is due to a rise in current 
expenditure, while a fall in taxes is a reason behind a fall in total revenue.  
Focusing on established democracies, although there is no indication of changes in 
total expenditure and revenue (and thus no budget cycles), central governments appear to 
reallocate those components. Specifically, there is clear evidence that they increase one 
particular current component, namely grants to OGU, offset by a fall in capital spending. 
Importantly, this result is in line with Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) and Brender and Drazen 
(2013). The former, focusing on 19 high-income OECD (thus established) democracies, show 
that elections shift spending from capital to current spending, whereas the latter present the 
evidence of election year spending reallocations in established democracies (although they do 
not identity the spending components that have been reallocated). Regarding revenue 
components in established democracies, Table 4 again suggests possible reallocation effects of 
elections. In particular, while income taxes fall, this appears to be (at least partially) 
compensated for by an increase in consumption taxes.  
                                                          
33
 To be precise, we only classify a country as an established democracy if it was democratic for at least 
10 years before the start of the sample period. That is, it must have been democratic from 1965 to 2010. 
34
 As in Brender and Drazen (2005), these countries’ following elections are not included in the 
estimations. As a robustness test, we used a different strategy, according to which a democracy would 
be new during the first four elections, and would become established thereafter. Although most results 
(not shown here) are similar, the distinction between the results for established and new democracies is 
not as sharp as when using Brender and Drazen’s (2005) definition. 
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To emphasize, in new democracies, this type of reallocation effects are absent, with an 
evidence of the rise in total expenditure and the fall in total revenue instead. Therefore, it 
appears that these expenditure/revenue reallocations are a phenomenon strictly in 
established democracies. Lastly, it is worth noting that all the key results from the interaction 
regressions are still observed when we run separate regressions for established and new 
democracies (see Tables A.6a and A.6b in the Appendix).  
 
Electoral rule 
Finally, when we consider the electoral rule as one important characteristic of political 
institutions which may affect politicians’ opportunistic behavior in election years, the results 
reported in Table 5 clearly confirm those obtained by Persson and Tabellini (2003). That is, 
only under proportional regimes are elections associated with an increase in the budget 
deficit. Additionally, our disaggregated data reveals further distinct patterns regarding 
components, particularly in terms of spending. Specifically, while the budget cycle appears to 
be mainly driven by total expenditure, this is predominantly due to a rise in current spending, 
particularly grants to OGU. Meanwhile, capital spending appears to fall (according to system 
GMM results).35 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
5.3. Other political considerations 
Several additional tests, whose results are not reported here for brevity, were also 
performed.36 First, we investigated if government fragmentation influences its ability to 
engender fiscal electoral cycles. In some specifications, there is evidence of a larger distortion 
of total revenue and total taxes in electoral periods by single party governments than by 
                                                          
35
 The Tables A.7a and A.7b in the Appendix report, respectively, the results obtained when using 
separate samples for proportional and majoritarian electoral rules. 
36
 All of these results are available from the authors upon request. 
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coalition governments, leading to larger deficits. Second, we used the Heinisz (2000) index of 
political constraints as an indicator of the government’s ability to generate PBC. Overall results 
for high/low indices are not clear-cut, except for the fact that total revenue tends to decrease 
in election years when constraints are lower. Third, following Shi and Svenson (2006), we 
proxied the level of rents extracted while in power, using an institutional index constructed 
with indicators provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).37 Two dummy 
variables were created for observations where the level of rents is high/low. Although there 
are no robust results regarding the budget deficit, there seems to be larger manipulation of 
overall taxes and of total and current expenditure when the rents are considered to be high. 
Fourth, we analysed whether electoral effects differ among developed/developing countries, 
and among strong/weak38 democracies. Although no consistent robust results were found 
regarding the degree of prevalence of PBC, the reallocation of expenditures towards grants to 
OGU in electoral years seems to be present in developed countries and in strong democracies 
(as shown above for established democracies). Fifth, following Alesina and Tabellini (1990), we 
examined whether changes in the ideology of the government influence the magnitude of 
opportunistic fiscal measures. No clear-cut results were obtained. Finally, the role of political 
institutions (Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2003a, 2003b) in shaping PBC was also examined. 
There is some evidence of a reduction in total revenue and overall taxes in presidential 
regimes, while in parliamentary democracies increases in grants to OGU seem to be 
compensated by decreases in capital expenditure.  
 
6. Conclusions 
To the best of our knowledge, we have assembled the largest and most comprehensive 
database on fiscal policy variables ever used in panel-country studies focusing on budgetary 
opportunistic effects. This detailed database allowed us to investigate the electoral effects on 
                                                          
37
 The indicators used are: law and order, corruption, bureaucratic quality, and investment profile. 
38
 Democracies were defined as strong when the variable POLITY2 was greater or equal to 8. 
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the composition of central governments’ expenditure and revenue series under various 
political arrangements. 
The main results are summarized as follows: 
(1) There is evidence for political budget cycles (PBC) at the central government level when 
using a sample comprising all democracies and elections. While PBC are driven by an 
increase in current spending and a reduction in taxes, when these spending and revenue 
components are further disaggregated, a rise in grants to other government units (OGU)39 
and a fall in income taxes stand out.  
(2) Budget cycles are not universal. They are more likely to occur when the timing of elections 
is predetermined and under specific political circumstances. The latter include close 
(disputed) elections, a high proportion of relatively uninformed voters, new democracies, 
and proportional electoral rules. Importantly, under these circumstances, a rise in current 
spending and a fall in taxes are predominant drivers of PBC, while grants to OGU and 
income taxes are often particularly relevant subcomponents. 
(3) In established democracies, there is no evidence of election year deficits. Rather, central 
governments appear to reallocate both expenditure and revenue components in election 
years, while not changing their total levels. In particular, they reallocate spending from 
capital spending to grants to OGU and they reduce income taxes and increase 
consumption taxes instead. 
While the previous literature indicated those conditions relevant for the occurrence of PBC, we 
here added to it by examining the specific drivers of PBC in terms of both expenditure and 
revenue components. Critically, we found that central governments raise current, rather than 
capital, spending in election years. To interpret, this is somewhat consistent with Rogoff 
(1990), who argues that capital expenditure, which often takes long to materialize, may not be 
                                                          
39
 Although new in the cross-country context, this finding is consistent with the results obtained by 
previous research focusing on specific countries and using regional/local data (i.e. Veiga and Pinho, 
2007; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Veiga and Veiga, 2013). 
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as suitable to signal the incumbent policymaker’s competence as immediately-observed 
current spending. Regarding the particular use of grants to OGU as a manipulative tool in 
election years, we may interpret it as central governments’ pork-barrel spending policies in an 
attempt to win votes by benefitting specific localities. These interpretations, when combined, 
explain the particular reallocation pattern observed under established democracies. 
Turning to the revenue, particularly tax components, it may be useful to acknowledge that 
a number of studies argue that some taxes are more salient than others. For instance, while 
Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) show that taxpayers underreact to taxes that are not salient, 
Blumkin, Ruffle and Ganun (2012) argue that individuals underestimate the tax burden 
associated with an indirect consumption tax, relative to the tax burden resulting from an 
equivalent, but immediately visible, direct wage tax. Following this line of thinking, central 
governments may deliberately reduce more directly-felt (by voters) income taxes when 
generating PBC. Further, it is possible to interpret the tax reallocation behavior under 
established democracies similarly, because consumption taxes appear to be less salient than 
income taxes. 
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Table 1a. Electoral effects for all democracies (Fixed Effects) 
 
Total 
Revenue 
Taxes 
Total 
Income 
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants to 
OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget 
Deficit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
L.CG_gdp 0.756*** 0.726*** 0.764*** 0.810*** 0.834*** 0.832*** 0.505*** 0.699*** 
 
(28.202) (21.186) (18.011) (21.573) (25.268) (28.339) (7.049) (11.085) 
Election year -0.285*** -0.235*** -0.120** 0.245* 0.343*** 0.140*** -0.063 0.412*** 
 
(-2.976) (-3.264) (-2.642) (1.911) (2.947) (2.746) (-1.629) (2.703) 
Log(GDPpc 2005) -0.015 -0.051 0.399 0.179 0.195 -0.216 -0.058 -0.790 
 
(-0.025) (-0.128) (1.217) (0.226) (0.268) (-0.535) (-0.148) (-1.298) 
Trade (%GDP) -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.864) (-0.297) (-0.916) (-1.369) (-1.536) (-0.970) (0.302) (-0.181) 
% Pop below 15 -0.058 -0.062** -0.041** -0.015 -0.023 -0.025 -0.002 0.005 
 
(-1.138) (-2.373) (-2.163) (-0.419) (-0.694) (-0.797) (-0.103) (0.105) 
% Pop over 65 0.115 -0.120** -0.085** -0.033 -0.075 -0.022 0.010 -0.051 
 
(1.094) (-2.606) (-2.356) (-0.243) (-0.659) (-0.397) (0.326) (-0.294) 
Output gap 0.913 -1.384 -1.330 14.136*** 15.817*** 3.008** -1.418 12.152*** 
 
(0.389) (-0.733) (-0.885) (3.373) (4.594) (2.509) (-0.846) (2.692) 
Trend 0.023 0.037* 0.008 -0.118*** -0.120*** -0.017 -0.034** -0.113*** 
 (0.805) (1.962) (0.674) (-2.741) (-3.043) (-1.054) (-2.307) (-3.345) 
Trend squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 
 (-0.736) (-0.946) (-0.560) (3.590) (3.997) (2.126) (2.179) (2.667) 
Constant 7.413 7.538** 0.075 6.346 5.757 3.623 1.733 8.807 
 
(1.276) (1.988) (0.027) (0.977) (0.922) (0.862) (0.476) (1.466) 
 
        
# Observations 1,766 1,839 1,435 1,068 1,200 1,095 1,222 1,028 
# Countries 106 107 71 73 74 66 77 70 
Adjusted R
2 0.687 0.646 0.669 0.701 0.736 0.722 0.289 0.467 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
Notes:  
- All elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010. 
- Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- Fixed Effects estimations.  
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 1b. Electoral effects for all democracies (System-GMM) 
 
Total 
Revenue 
Taxes 
Total 
Income 
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants to 
OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget 
Deficit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
L.CG_gdp 0.651*** 0.766*** 0.586*** 0.659*** 0.702*** 0.927*** 0.826*** 0.852*** 
 
(5.338) (8.878) (3.585) (3.677) (6.320) (12.021) (4.748) (4.050) 
Election year -0.311*** -0.230*** -0.129*** 0.145 0.253* 0.091* -0.119** 0.458*** 
 
(-3.236) (-3.099) (-2.716) (0.919) (1.891) (1.834) (-2.241) (2.723) 
Log(GDPpc 2005) 0.745 0.498 1.884 6.467** 6.205*** -0.110 0.758 2.825 
 
(1.053) (0.751) (1.627) (2.287) (2.739) (-0.579) (0.661) (0.491) 
Trade (%GDP) 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.034 0.027 0.003 0.012 0.076 
 
(0.208) (0.138) (0.287) (1.115) (0.972) (0.263) (0.983) (0.660) 
% Pop below 15 0.076 0.037 0.131 0.721*** 0.671*** -0.005 0.100 0.391 
 
(0.756) (0.445) (1.312) (2.887) (3.346) (-0.103) (0.943) (0.668) 
% Pop over 65 0.382** 0.057 -0.059 0.140 0.113 0.019 -0.022 -0.010 
 
(2.179) (0.560) (-0.542) (0.515) (0.392) (0.453) (-0.322) (-0.024) 
Output gap 8.293 7.294* 2.704 -35.424** -27.004** 1.682 -1.090 -17.203 
 
(1.549) (1.652) (1.148) (-2.277) (-2.464) (0.633) (-0.241) (-0.649) 
Trend -0.014 0.011 0.046 0.169 0.197 -0.027 0.039 0.016 
 (-0.286) (0.349) (0.888) (1.290) (1.588) (-1.338) (0.665) (0.066) 
Trend squared 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.457) (-0.094) (-0.539) (-1.211) (-1.409) (1.032) (-0.688) (-0.111) 
Constant -3.143 -2.110 -17.711 -72.379** -70.418*** 1.207 -10.126 -40.898 
 
(-0.360) (-0.265) (-1.469) (-2.457) (-2.862) (0.342) (-0.727) (-0.560) 
 
        
# Observations 1,769 1,843 1,440 1,072 1,205 1,098 1,227 1,031 
# Countries 106 107 71 73 74 66 77 70 
# Instruments 18 18 17 18 18 18 18 14 
AR(1), p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
AR(2), p-value 0.43 0.22 0.23 0.62 0.89 0.96 0.26 0.99 
Hansen, p-value 0.50 0.28 0.50 0.43 0.84 0.08 0.33 0.66 
Diff Hansen1, p-value 0.21 0.12 0.28 0.19 0.50 0.05 0.24 0.66 
Diff Hansen2, p-value 0.42 0.41 0.24 0.28 0.66 0.09 0.66 0.31 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
Notes: - All elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010. 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1975-2010. 
- Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and three 
periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were used in 
the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was used in order to avoid a very high 
number of instruments. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 2. Close versus not close elections 
 
Total  
Revenue 
Taxes 
Income  
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants 
to OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget  
Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fixed Effects         
CloseE*Election_year -0.242 -0.336*** -0.191** 0.457* 0.604*** 0.112 -0.116*** 0.647*** 
 
(-1.603) (-3.062) (-2.421) (1.890) (2.755) (1.305) (-2.884) (2.804) 
NotClose*Election_year -0.330* -0.118 -0.0958 0.198 0.262 0.219** -0.0372 0.389 
 
(-1.855) (-1.009) (-1.302) (0.969) (1.362) (2.090) (-0.660) (1.514) 
Number of Observations 1,223 1,283 1,011 775 874 788 878 743 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 64 65 61 67 63 
System-GMM         
CloseE*Election_year -0.224 -0.329*** -0.167** 0.576* 0.642** 0.166* -0.147** 0.815*** 
 (-1.520) (-2.623) (-2.038) (1.663) (2.318) (1.785) (-2.418) (3.023) 
NotClose*Election_year -0.276 -0.126 -0.140** -0.346 0.121 -0.002 -0.095 0.164 
 (-1.334) (-0.907) (-2.167) (-1.105) (0.419) (-0.025) (-1.312) (0.537) 
Number of Observations 1,224 1,285 1,013 777 877 790 880 744 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 64 65 61 67 63 
         
Fixed Effects         
CloseE*Election_year2 -0.493* -0.555*** -0.212** 0.242 0.506* 0.119 -0.103 0.638 
 
(-1.924) (-2.708) (-2.169) (0.718) (1.767) (1.139) (-1.576) (1.546) 
NotClose*Election_year2 -0.402* -0.200 -0.0737 0.115 0.270 0.246* -0.0517 0.219 
 (-1.685) (-1.194) (-0.665) (0.365) (0.942) (1.821) (-0.849) (0.543) 
Number of Observations 1,223 1,283 1,011 775 874 788 878 743 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 64 65 61 67 63 
System-GMM         
CloseE*Election_year2 -0.388* -0.640*** -0.232** 0.492 0.803 0.187* -0.127 1.321** 
 (-1.837) (-2.904) (-2.143) (0.574) (0.928) (1.773) (-1.315) (2.087) 
NotClose*Election_year2 -0.561* -0.376 -0.261** -0.781* -0.337 0.026 -0.257** -0.140 
 (-1.769) (-1.385) (-2.087) (-1.926) (-0.508) (0.286) (-2.123) (-0.285) 
Number of Observations 1,224 1,285 1,013 777 877 790 880 744 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 64 65 61 67 63 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
General notes: - Predetermined elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010. Estimated model: 
𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝐸𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡) + ∅𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
- All the control variables (X) were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficients (𝛽1 
and 𝛽2) of the interactions of the election-year variable with the dummies for close and not close elections are shown. 
Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
Notes for the System-GMM estimations: 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and three 
periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were used in 
the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was used in order to avoid a very high 
number of instruments. 
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Table 3. High (75th percentile) versus low index of media diffusion  
 
Total  
Revenue 
Taxes 
Income  
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants 
to OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget  
Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fixed Effects         
ImdH*Election_year -0.110 -0.155* -0.131* 0.191 0.280*** 0.151* -0.0265 0.301* 
 
(-0.921) (-1.673) (-1.814) (1.632) (2.671) (1.876) (-0.689) (1.813) 
ImdL*Election_year -0.489** -0.339*** -0.183*** 0.572* 0.779** 0.173* -0.167** 0.956** 
 
(-2.606) (-2.674) (-2.815) (1.698) (2.440) (1.682) (-2.278) (2.294) 
Number of Observations 1,223 1,283 1,011 775 874 788 878 743 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 64 65 61 67 63 
System-GMM         
ImdH*Election_year 0.016 -0.176 -0.161* 0.188 0.158 0.099 -0.045 0.276 
 (0.092) (-1.344) (-1.926) (0.931) (1.014) (1.453) (-1.166) (1.446) 
ImdL*Election_year -0.443** -0.232* -0.195*** 0.515 0.875*** 0.037 -0.293** 1.096*** 
 (-2.112) (-1.734) (-3.432) (1.391) (2.717) (0.409) (-2.565) (2.931) 
Number of Observations 1,224 1,285 1,013 777 877 790 880 744 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 64 65 61 67 63 
         
Fixed Effects         
ImdH*Election_year2 -0.259 -0.228 -0.109 0.0360 0.247 0.151 -0.0433 0.200 
 
(-1.236) (-1.615) (-1.171) (0.199) (1.603) (1.427) (-0.940) (0.758) 
ImdL*Election_year2 -0.716** -0.620** -0.222** 0.438 0.741** 0.229** -0.151 0.998 
 (-2.425) (-2.414) (-2.257) (1.145) (2.010) (2.075) (-1.425) (1.539) 
Number of Observations 1,223 1,283 1,011 775 874 788 878 743 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 64 65 61 67 63 
System-GMM         
ImdH*Election_year2 -0.336 -0.389* -0.255** -0.396 -0.122 0.074 -0.076 0.238 
 (-1.411) (-1.665) (-2.103) (-0.954) (-0.416) (0.839) (-1.043) (0.618) 
ImdL*Election_year2 -0.718** -0.460* -0.245*** 0.686 1.018* 0.009 -0.457** 1.694*** 
 (-2.354) (-1.906) (-2.875) (1.410) (1.932) (0.076) (-2.413) (2.580) 
Number of Observations 1,224 1,285 1,013 777 877 790 880 744 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 64 65 61 67 63 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
General notes: - Predetermined elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010. Estimated model: 
𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐻𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑖𝑡) + ∅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- All the control variables (X) were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficients (𝛽1 
and 𝛽2) of the interactions of the election-year variable with the dummies for high and low index of media diffusion are 
shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
Notes for the System-GMM estimations: 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and three 
periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were used in 
the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was used in order to avoid a very high 
number of instruments. 
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Table 4. Established versus new democracies  
 
Total  
Revenue 
Taxes 
Income  
Taxes 
Consumptio
n Taxes 
Total 
Expend. 
Current 
Expend. 
Grants 
to OGU 
Capital 
Expend. 
Budget  
Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Fixed Effects          
Est_dem*Election_year -0.105 -0.168* -0.176*** 0.117** 0.147 0.235* 0.185** -0.0747** 0.211 
 
(-0.898) (-1.973) (-2.933) (2.302) (0.959) (1.808) (2.274) (-2.269) (1.298) 
New_dem*Election_year -0.338 -0.264* 0.00422 -0.143 0.789* 0.989*** 0.0995 -0.120 0.941* 
 
(-1.542) (-1.668) (0.0440) (-1.121) (1.987) (2.695) (0.673) (-1.436) (1.947) 
Number of Observations 1,223 1,283 1,011 1,009 775 874 788 878 743 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 63 64 65 61 67 63 
System-GMM          
Est_dem*Election_year 0.078 -0.232** -0.211** 0.182*** -0.203 -0.000 0.203** -0.084* 0.0278 
 (0.363) (-2.027) (-2.106) (2.581) (-0.672) (-0.001) (2.449) (-1.798) (0.0895) 
New_dem*Election_year -0.409* -0.233* -0.0621 -0.157 1.084** 0.986** -0.169 -0.224* 0.961** 
 (-1.693) (-1.905) (-0.642) (-1.115) (2.312) (2.536) (-1.350) (-1.679) (2.475) 
Number of Observations 1,224 1,285 1,013 1,010 777 877 790 880 744 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 63 64 65 61 67 63 
          
Fixed Effects          
Est_dem*Election_year2 -0.226 -0.250* -0.245*** 0.164** -0.0678 0.159 0.160** -0.0989** 0.00625 
 
(-1.064) (-1.858) (-3.073) (2.284) (-0.383) (1.174) (2.654) (-2.201) (0.0270) 
New_dem*Election_year2 -0.478* -0.509** 0.0489 -0.226 0.669 0.940** 0.105 -0.0869 0.812 
 (-1.687) (-2.038) (0.383) (-1.596) (1.633) (2.327) (0.457) (-0.895) (1.341) 
Number of Observations 1,223 1,283 1,011 1,009 775 874 788 878 743 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 63 64 65 61 67 63 
System-GMM          
Est_dem*Election_year2 -0.168 -0.316 -0.355*** 0.233** -0.640 -0.547 0.222*** -0.143** 0.0290 
 (-0.475) (-1.206) (-2.851) (2.328) (-1.016) (-1.355) (2.778) (-2.015) (0.0480) 
New_dem*Election_year2 -0.582* -0.502** -0.0649 -0.175 0.825* 0.909** -0.236 -0.186 1.025* 
 (-1.874) (-2.190) (-0.587) (-1.023) (1.672) (2.181) (-1.264) (-1.018) (1.715) 
Number of Observations 1,224 1,285 1,013 1,010 777 877 790 880 744 
Number of Countries 91 91 64 63 64 65 61 67 63 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
General notes: - Predetermined elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010. Estimated model: 
𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑠𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑤_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡) + ∅𝑁𝑒𝑤_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- All the control variables (X) were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficients (𝛽1 
and 𝛽2) of the interactions of the election-year variable with the dummies for established and new democracies are 
shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
Notes for the System-GMM estimations: 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. 
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and three 
periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were used in 
the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was used in order to avoid a very high 
number of instruments.  
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Table 5. Proportional versus plurality electoral rule  
 
Total  
Revenue 
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants 
to OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget  
Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Fixed Effects        
Proportional*Election_year -0.212 -0.248** 0.595*** 0.655*** 0.214** -0.0431 0.658*** 
 
(-1.340) (-2.290) (3.013) (3.502) (2.165) (-0.932) (2.703) 
Plurality *Election_year -0.083 -0.0280 -0.157 -0.050 -0.0844 -0.0867 0.0642 
 
(-0.482) (-0.218) (-0.758) (-0.293) (-1.060) (-1.283) (0.212) 
Number of Observations 1,213 1,276 766 865 785 869 736 
Number of Countries 90 90 63 64 60 66 62 
System-GMM        
Proportional*Election_year 0.031 -0.140 0.660*** 0.693*** 0.191** -0.179** 0.614** 
 (0.165) (-1.212) (2.646) (3.186) (2.234) (-2.468) (2.060) 
Plurality*Election_year -0.538** -0.286* -0.807 -0.449 -0.167* 0.108 0.149 
 (-1.981) (-1.815) (-1.129) (-0.738) (-1.928) (0.942) (0.207) 
Number of Observations 1,224 1,285 768 868 787 871 744 
Number of Countries 91 91 63 64 60 66 63 
        
Fixed Effects        
Proportional*Election_year2 -0.368 -0.341* 0.455* 0.607*** 0.235* -0.0325 0.584 
 
(-1.462) (-1.738) (1.903) (2.797) (1.874) (-0.576) (1.665) 
Plurality*Election_year2 -0.0911 -0.116 -0.0967 0.0359 -0.0409 -0.0998 0.206 
 (-0.333) (-0.581) (-0.333) (0.168) (-0.461) (-1.186) (0.376) 
Number of Observations 1,213 1,276 766 865 785 869 736 
Number of Countries 90 90 63 64 60 66 62 
System-GMM        
Proportional*Election_year2 -0.171 -0.230 0.783* 0.855** 0.192* -0.166* 1.055** 
 (-0.610) (-1.382) (1.877) (2.090) (1.723) (-1.924) (1.960) 
Plurality*Election_year2 -0.537 -0.488** -0.631 -0.556 -0.174 0.007 -0.122 
 (-1.097) (-2.031) (-0.640) (-0.695) (-1.583) (0.049) (-0.191) 
Number of Observations 1,224 1,285 768 868 787 871 744 
Number of Countries 91 91 63 64 60 66 63 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
General notes: - Predetermined elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010. Estimated model: 
𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡) + ∅𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- All the control variables (X) were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficients (𝛽1 
and 𝛽2) of the interactions of the election-year variable with the dummies for proportional and plurality electoral 
systems are shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
Notes for the System-GMM estimations: 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and three 
periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were used in 
the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was used in order to avoid a very high 
number of instruments; 
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Appendix  
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Description and Source 
Central Government Revenues (source: GFS – IMF) 
CG1_gdp 1956 26.91 9.60 8.90 50.97 Total revenue (%GDP) 
CG11_gdp 2011 17.18 5.91 6.04 34.56 Taxes (%GDP) 
CG111_gdp 1557 6.95 3.98 1.10 15.48 Income taxes (%GDP) 
CG112_gdp 520 0.62 0.64 0.01 2.51 Taxes on payroll (%GDP) 
CG113_gdp 1259 0.50 0.42 0.01 1.84 Property taxes (%GDP) 
CG114_gdp 1552 8.31 3.29 1.30 15.24 Consumption taxes (%GDP) 
CG115_gdp 1261 1.64 1.80 0.01 10.57 International trade taxes (%GDP) 
CG12_gdp 1539 6.21 4.88 0.01 15.85 Social contributions (%GDP) 
CG13_gdp 1567 1.01 1.55 0.01 9.54 Grants (%GDP) 
CG14_gdp 1759 3.21 2.42 0.58 21.71 Other revenues (%GDP) 
Central Government Expenditures (source: GFS – IMF) 
CGexpenditure_gdp 1224 31.16 9.92 10.94 63.84 Total expenditure (%GDP) 
CG2_gdp 1336 29.09 10.19 10.30 62.52 
Expense (%GDP) (without consumption of fixed 
capital. CG23) 
CG21_gdp 1814 5.73 2.67 1.71 14.23 Compensation of employees (%GDP) 
CG22_gdp 1812 3.91 2.11 0.94 13.10 Use of goods and services (%GDP) 
CG24_gdp 1897 2.55 1.78 0.20 9.02 Interest (%GDP) 
CG25_gdp 1256 1.26 1.02 0.06 4.77 Subsidies (%GDP) 
CG26_gdp 1461 4.03 2.80 0.16 13.50 Grants (%GDP) 
CG261_gdp 1059 0.41 0.41 0.01 1.70 Grants abroad(%GDP) 
CG263_gdp 1185 4.05 2.64 0.31 12.06 Grants to other govt units(%GDP) 
CG27_gdp 1302 8.59 5.98 0.12 20.46 Social benefits (%GDP) 
CG31_gdp 1366 1.97 1.84 0.32 22.83 
Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets (%GDP) 
(with consumption of fixed capital) 
CGdeficit_gdp 1186 2.17 4.27 -19.85 31.33 Budget deficit (%GDP) 
Democracy (sources: Polity IV and Cheibub, et al. 2010) 
Polity2 2975 7.44 2.83 0.00 10.00 
Combined Polity Score (autocracy-democracy 
scale from -10 to 10) (Polity IV) 
Democracy 2975 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 Democracy dummy (=1 if polity2>0) (Polity IV) 
New democracy 2955 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 New democracy - first 4 elections (Polity IV) 
Established democ. 2975 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 Established democracy (since 1965) (polity IV) 
Democracy_CGV 2957 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 Democracy dummy (Cheibub et al. 2010) 
New democ_CGV 2351 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 New democracy (Cheibub et al. 2010) 
Estab. Democ._CGV  2364 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 Established democracy (Cheibub et al. 2010) 
Institutions (sources: Freedom House, CNTS, ICRG, and Heinisz, 2000)) 
IMD 2756 0.80 0.84 0.00 4.21 Index of media diffusion (Freedom House, CNTS) 
Institutional Index 2975 7.44 2.83 0.00 10.00 
Institutional index similar to Shi and Svensson’s 
(2006). Data from ICRG. 
Political constraints 2931 0.37 0.17 0.00 0.72 Index of political constraints (Heinisz, 2000). 
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Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Description 
Elections and type of system (source: DPI-World Bank) 
Election_year 2975 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Election year for the government leader 
(President or Prime Minister) 
Election_year2 2423 0.15 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Election year for the government: equals 
election_month/12 in the election year, (1- 
election_month/12) in the year before, and 
zero otherwise 
Pred_Election_year 2975 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Election year for the government leader 
(President or Prime Minister). Only 
predetermined elections considered. 
Pred_Election_year2 2975 0.09 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Election year for the government: equals 
election_month/12 in the election year, (1- 
election_month/12) in the year before, and 
zero otherwise. Only predetermined elections 
considered. 
System 2933 1.05 0.97 0.00 2.00 Political System (Parliamentary/Presidential) 
PR 2722 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 Proportional Representation dummy 
Close election 2933 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Dummy for close elections (equals 1 if margin 
of victory smaller than 10 percentage points) 
Single party 2975 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable for single party governments. 
Two-party 2975 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Dummy variable for two party systems (equals 
1 when the effective number of parties is 
smaller than 3). 
Macroeconomic and demographic variables (sources: WEO-IMF and WDI-World Bank) 
Log(GDPpc 2005) 2811 8.25 1.61 3.91 11.38 
Log of GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) – 
WDI 
Trade (% GDP) 2837 76.14 40.63 9.10 333.53 Trade (% of GDP) 
% Pop below 15 2953 30.50 10.62 13.27 49.83 Population ages 0-14 (% of total) – WDI  
% Pop above 65 2953 8.20 5.04 1.98 22.96 
Population ages 65 and above (% of total) – 
WDI  
Output_gap 2906 0.00 0.03 -0.67 0.26 Log(NGDP_R)-log(HPtrend of NGDP_R) - WEO 
Note: The sample covers all 2975 observations for which countries were democracies (variable POLITY2 from DPI 
greater or equal to zero). 
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Table A.2. Electoral effects for all democracies (Fixed Effects, with democracy defined according to 
Cheibub et al. 2010) 
 
Total 
Revenue 
Taxes 
Total 
Income 
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants to 
OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget 
Deficit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
L.CG_gdp 0.732*** 0.722*** 0.778*** 0.827*** 0.840*** 0.838*** 0.676*** 0.717*** 
 
(20.640) (23.511) (18.697) (20.861) (23.741) (28.949) (10.362) (10.099) 
Election year -0.182* -0.227*** -0.113** 0.263** 0.373*** 0.121** -0.077** 0.492*** 
 
(-1.791) (-3.130) (-2.456) (2.145) (3.417) (2.452) (-2.180) (3.409) 
Log(GDPpc 2005) -0.282 -0.426 0.272 -1.071 -0.945 0.199 -0.068 -1.165 
 
(-0.296) (-0.936) (0.781) (-1.145) (-1.068) (0.614) (-0.210) (-1.424) 
Trade (%GDP) -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
 
(-0.957) (-0.920) (-1.089) (-0.444) (-0.706) (-0.956) (0.206) (0.209) 
% Pop below 15 -0.064 -0.085*** -0.044** -0.080* -0.077* -0.005 -0.012 -0.027 
 
(-1.047) (-3.037) (-2.208) (-1.833) (-1.813) (-0.164) (-0.798) (-0.550) 
% Pop over 65 0.143 -0.122*** -0.082** -0.068 -0.086 -0.006 -0.022 -0.102 
 
(1.305) (-2.876) (-2.381) (-0.513) (-0.786) (-0.125) (-1.102) (-0.545) 
Output gap -0.134 -2.185 -0.763 23.854*** 22.694*** 2.458** -0.033 17.946*** 
 
(-0.051) (-1.128) (-0.461) (4.813) (5.732) (2.038) (-0.027) (3.014) 
Trend 0.028 0.035** 0.008 -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.023 -0.011 -0.110*** 
 
(0.958) (2.111) (0.606) (-2.846) (-2.984) (-1.455) (-1.121) (-3.770) 
Trend squared -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.000 0.004*** 
 
(-0.946) (-0.796) (-0.354) (4.040) (4.375) (2.069) (1.239) (2.911) 
Constant 10.223 11.814** 1.136 18.963** 17.341** -0.727 1.809 13.499* 
 
(1.068) (2.581) (0.367) (2.207) (2.069) (-0.224) (0.587) (1.676) 
 
        
# Observations 1,741 1,818 1,375 999 1,139 1,073 1,154 971 
# Countries 99 101 66 71 73 63 73 69 
Adjusted R
2 
0.650 0.648 0.693 0.709 0.737 0.729 0.477 0.463 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and Cheibub et al. (2010). 
Notes:  
- All elections in democracies (using the democracy dummy variable of Cheibub et al. 2010).  
- Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- Fixed Effects estimations. Sample period: 1975-2010. 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table A.3. Electoral effects for all democracies (Fixed Effects with year dummies) 
 
Total 
Revenue 
Taxes 
Total 
Income 
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants to 
OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget 
Deficit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
L.CG_gdp 0.761*** 0.730*** 0.773*** 0.796*** 0.822*** 0.836*** 0.499*** 0.668*** 
 
(28.335) (21.398) (19.792) (21.665) (25.874) (29.047) (7.129) (11.807) 
Election year -0.264*** -0.228*** -0.090* 0.260** 0.345*** 0.147*** -0.045 0.381** 
 
(-2.834) (-3.165) (-1.971) (2.066) (3.127) (2.894) (-1.079) (2.506) 
Log(GDPpc 2005) 0.015 -0.034 0.288 0.434 0.501 -0.221 0.073 -0.806 
 
(0.028) (-0.083) (1.087) (0.550) (0.669) (-0.548) (0.177) (-1.000) 
Trade (%GDP) -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.015* -0.015** -0.002 0.000 -0.007 
 
(-0.179) (0.290) (-0.244) (-1.936) (-2.121) (-0.844) (0.009) (-1.209) 
% Pop below 15 -0.059 -0.070** -0.047** 0.004 0.005 -0.026 -0.007 0.026 
 
(-1.102) (-2.384) (-2.377) (0.088) (0.113) (-0.821) (-0.300) (0.484) 
% Pop over 65 0.114 -0.124*** -0.074** 0.010 -0.049 -0.021 0.004 -0.046 
 
(1.065) (-2.906) (-2.291) (0.070) (-0.379) (-0.370) (0.136) (-0.274) 
Output gap -0.316 2.555 1.252 -10.924** -10.954*** 0.531 0.264 -8.815** 
 
(-0.118) (1.209) (0.767) (-2.307) (-3.180) (0.286) (0.109) (-2.419) 
Constant 6.960 7.116* 1.089 4.041 2.876 3.854 1.091 8.530 
 
(1.216) (1.776) (0.467) (0.627) (0.458) (0.911) (0.287) (1.083) 
 
        
# Observations 1,769 1,843 1,440 1,072 1,205 1,098 1,227 1,031 
# Countries 106 107 71 73 74 66 77 70 
Adjusted R
2 
0.696 0.668 0.689 0.726 0.760 0.730 0.305 0.546 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
Notes:  
- All elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010. 
- Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- Fixed Effects estimations including year dummies (coefficients are not shown for brevity). 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table A.4. Close elections  
 
Total  
Revenue 
Taxes 
Income  
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants 
to OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget  
Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fixed Effects         
Election_year -0.241 -0.268*** -0.172** 0.407 0.540** 0.0840 -0.0881** 0.502** 
 
(-1.623) (-2.908) (-2.205) (1.664) (2.413) (0.940) (-2.332) (2.115) 
N. observations 702 735 605 445 504 451 504 432 
N. countries 70 70 53 48 48 46 50 48 
System-GMM         
Election_year -0.247* -0.235** -0.145** 0.517 0.686*** 0.273* -0.084* 0.616** 
 (-1.796) (-2.003) (-2.010) (1.559) (2.947) (1.673) (-1.886) (2.212) 
N. observations 702 735 605 445 504 451 504 744 
N. countries 70 70 53 48 48 46 50 63 
         
Fixed Effects         
Election_year2 -0.476* -0.400*** -0.179* 0.168 0.055 0.0817 -0.0657 0.417 
 
(-1.977) (-2.685) (-1.746) (0.492) (0.470) (0.736) (-1.030) (1.040) 
N. observations 702 735 605 445 504 451 504 432 
N. countries 70 70 53 48 48 46 50 48 
System-GMM         
Election_year2 -0.450** -0.395** -0.240** 0.279 0.828* 0.460* -0.135** 0.643* 
 (-2.045) (-1.992) (-2.533) (0.412) (1.691) (1.646) (-2.012) (1.694) 
N. Observations 702 735 605 445 504 451 504 744 
N. Countries 70 70 53 48 48 46 50 63 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
General notes: - Predetermined and close elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010. 
- Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient (𝛽) of the 
election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
Notes for the System-GMM estimations: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models; 
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and three 
periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were used in 
the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was used in order to avoid a very high 
number of instruments; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
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Table A.5. Low index of media diffusion 
 
Total  
Revenue 
Taxes 
Income  
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants 
to OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget  
Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fixed Effects         
Election_year -0.443** -0.346*** -0.199*** 0.652** 0.774*** 0.186* -0.166** 0.982** 
 
(-2.431) (-2.828) (-3.123) (2.243) (2.793) (1.900) (-2.144) (2.542) 
N. Observations 559 592 405 297 311 258 362 285 
N. Countries 64 63 37 38 39 33 41 37 
System-GMM         
Election_year -0.412** -0.279*** -0.182* 0.486* 0.554* 0.149* -0.283** 0.780** 
 (-2.130) (-2.731) (-1.671) (1.674) (1.854) (1.811) (-2.458) (1.965) 
N. Observations 559 592 405 297 311 258 362 285 
N. Countries 64 63 37 38 39 33 41 37 
         
Fixed Effects         
Election_year2 -0.718** -0.665*** -0.264** 0.532 0.699** 0.241** -0.147 1.094* 
 (-2.503) (-3.017) (-2.677) (1.586) (2.186) (2.396) (-1.242) (1.852) 
N. Observations 559 592 405 297 311 258 362 285 
N. Countries 64 63 37 38 39 33 41 37 
System-GMM         
Election_year2 -0.412** -0.279*** -0.182* 1.282* 0.789* 0.061 -0.307* 1.515** 
 (-2.130) (-2.731) (-1.671) (1.814) (1.696) (0.665) (-1.775) (2.404) 
N. Observations 559 592 405 297 311 258 362 285 
N. Countries 64 63 37 38 39 33 41 37 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
General notes: - Predetermined elections in democracies (Polity2≥0) with low Index of Media Diffusion. 
Sample period: 1975-2010. 
- Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient 
(𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and 
*, 10%. 
Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
Notes for the System-GMM estimations: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models; 
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and 
three periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-
differences were used in the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was 
used in order to avoid a very high number of instruments; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
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Table A.6a. Established democracies  
 
Total  
Revenue 
Taxes 
Income  
Taxes 
Consumption 
Taxes 
Total 
Expend. 
Current 
Expend. 
Grants 
to OGU 
Capital 
Expendit. 
Budget  
Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Fixed Effects          
Election_year -0.108 -0.165* -0.181*** 0.141** 0.172 0.278** 0.196** -0.0775** 0.246 
 
(-0.886) (-1.908) (-2.992) (2.698) (1.135) (2.241) (2.348) (-2.345) (1.425) 
N. Observations 568 601 563 560 419 497 451 465 401 
N. Countries 28 28 27 26 25 26 26 25 25 
System-GMM          
Election_year -0.076 -0.234** -0.194* 0.136* 0.056 0.182 0.161** -0.087*** 0.197 
 (-0.457) (-2.087) (-1.891) (1.765) (0.299) (1.326) (2.096) (-3.302) (0.783) 
N. Observations 570 603 565 561 420 499 453 466 402 
N. Countries 28 28 27 26 25 26 26 25 25 
          
Fixed Effects          
Election_year2 -0.245 -0.257* -0.249*** 0.192** -0.0694 0.186 0.177** -0.112** 0.0108 
 
(-1.070) (-1.860) (-3.126) (2.763) (-0.391) (1.369) (2.648) (-2.522) (0.0449) 
N. Observations 568 601 563 560 419 497 451 465 401 
N. Countries 28 28 27 26 25 26 26 25 25 
System-GMM          
Election_year2 -0.346 -0.396** -0.342** 0.185* -0.210 0.056 0.165** -0.121*** 0.119 
 (-1.285) (-2.286) (-2.021) (1.669) (-0.675) (0.290) (2.010) (-2.966) (0.350) 
N. Observations 570 603 565 561 420 499 453 466 402 
N. Countries 28 28 27 26 25 26 26 25 25 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
General notes: - Predetermined elections in established democracies. Sample period: 1975-2010. 
- Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient 
(𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and 
*, 10%. 
Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
Notes for the System-GMM estimations: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models; 
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and 
three periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-
differences were used in the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was 
used in order to avoid a very high number of instruments; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
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Table A.6b. New democracies  
 
Total  
Revenue 
Taxes 
Income 
Taxes 
Consumption 
Taxes 
Total 
Expend. 
Current 
Expend. 
Grants 
to OGU 
Capital 
Expendit. 
Budget  
Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Fixed Effects          
Election_year -0.326 -0.268* -0.00395 -0.121 0.905** 1.034*** 0.116 -0.0903 1.014** 
 
(-1.627) (-1.832) (-0.0404) (-1.068) (2.386) (3.036) (0.828) (-1.056) (2.231) 
N. Observations 508 525 353 355 276 295 259 322 266 
N. Countries 60 60 36 36 37 37 31 40 35 
System-GMM          
Election_year -0.440* -0.203* -0.041 -0.092 1.143** 0.755** -0.132 -0.177* 0.562* 
 (-1.655) (-1.837) (-0.540) (-0.685) (1.995) (2.133) (-1.131) (-1.872) (1.743) 
N. Observations 508 526 354 356 277 296 259 323 266 
N. Countries 60 60 36 36 37 37 31 40 35 
          
Fixed Effects          
Election_year2 -0.461* -0.527** 0.0508 -0.189 0.921** 1.068*** 0.135 -0.0428 1.021* 
 (-1.779) (-2.309) (0.397) (-1.432) (2.282) (2.865) (0.606) (-0.402) (1.869) 
N. Observations 508 525 353 355 276 295 259 322 266 
N. Countries 60 60 36 36 37 37 31 40 35 
System-GMM          
Election_year2 -0.465* -0.336** -0.028 -0.100 1.669* 0.612* -0.223 -0.172 0.786* 
 (-1.727) (-2.131) (-0.237) (-0.623) (1.797) (1.669) (-1.232) (-1.238) (1.737) 
N. Observations 508 526 354 356 277 296 259 323 266 
N. Countries 60 60 36 36 37 37 31 40 35 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
General notes: - Predetermined elections in new democracies. Sample period: 1975-2010. 
- Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient 
(𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and 
*, 10%. 
Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
Notes for the System-GMM estimations: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models; 
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and 
three periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-
differences were used in the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was 
used in order to avoid a very high number of instruments; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
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Table A.7a. Proportional electoral rule 
 
Total  
Revenue 
Taxes 
Income  
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants 
to OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget  
Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fixed Effects         
Election_year -0.282* -0.296*** -0.126* 0.624*** 0.714*** 0.213** -0.0981*** 0.808*** 
 
(-1.918) (-2.860) (-1.985) (3.160) (3.761) (2.318) (-2.868) (3.349) 
N. Observations 760 805 703 493 552 527 554 475 
N. Countries 56 56 42 38 39 41 38 38 
System-GMM         
Election_year -0.215* -0.280** -0.168** 0.493** 0.634*** 0.172** -0.091** 0.738*** 
 (-1.646) (-2.423) (-2.421) (2.570) (3.930) (2.083) (-1.971) (3.387) 
N. Observations 761 806 705 494 554 529 555 476 
N. Countries 56 56 42 38 39 41 38 38 
         
Fixed Effects         
Election_year2 -0.496** -0.480** -0.0794 0.507* 0.677*** 0.213* -0.0980* 0.707* 
 
(-2.059) (-2.473) (-0.845) (1.914) (2.789) (1.744) (-1.894) (1.925) 
N. Observations 760 805 703 493 552 527 554 475 
N. Countries 56 56 42 38 39 41 38 38 
System-GMM         
Election_year2 -0.411* -0.571*** -0.135 0.586* 0.719*** 0.197* -0.151** 1.180** 
 (-1.795) (-2.651) (-0.941) (1.724) (2.663) (1.851) (-2.199) (2.386) 
N. Observations 761 806 705 494 554 529 555 476 
N. Countries 56 56 42 38 39 41 38 38 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
General notes: - Predetermined elections in democracies with proportional electoral rules. Sample period: 
1975-2010. 
- Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient 
(𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and 
*, 10%. 
Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
Notes for the System-GMM estimations: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models; 
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and 
three periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-
differences were used in the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was 
used in order to avoid a very high number of instruments; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
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Table A.7b. Majoritarian (plurality) electoral rule 
 
Total  
Revenue 
Taxes 
Income  
Taxes 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Grants 
to OGU 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Budget  
Deficit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fixed Effects         
Election_year -0.207 -0.141 -0.189** -0.155 -0.002 0.0759 -0.0500 0.148 
 
(-1.329) (-1.099) (-2.388) (-0.790) (-0.011) (1.394) (-0.765) (0.447) 
N. Observations 434 449 280 264 302 249 306 250 
N. Countries 36 37 24 27 27 20 30 25 
System-GMM         
Election_year -0.124 -0.225* -0.150* -0.063 -0.086 0.094 -0.010 0.006 
 (-0.895) (-1.693) (-1.804) (-0.132) (-0.575) (0.972) (-0.186) (0.019) 
N. Observations 434 450 280 265 303 249 307 250 
N. Countries 36 37 24 27 27 20 30 25 
         
Fixed Effects         
Election_year2 -0.241 -0.220 -0.251*** -0.218 0.0239 0.134** -0.0340 0.0769 
 (-0.972) (-1.296) (-3.053) (-0.803) (0.138) (2.142) (-0.383) (0.132) 
N. Observations 434 449 280 264 302 249 306 250 
N. Countries 36 37 24 27 27 20 30 25 
System-GMM         
Election_year2 -0.470 -0.429 -0.206** -0.545 -0.015 0.093 -0.029 0.151 
 (-1.461) (-1.636) (-2.122) (-1.404) (-0.062) (0.573) (-0.314) (0.293) 
N. Observations 434 450 280 265 303 249 307 250 
N. Countries 36 37 24 27 27 20 30 25 
Sources: IMF (GFS and WEO); World Bank (DPI and WDI), and PolityIV. 
General notes: - Predetermined elections in democracies with majoritarian (plurality) electoral rules. Sample 
period: 1975-2010. 
- Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
- All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient 
(𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and 
*, 10%. 
Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: 
- The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems. 
Notes for the System-GMM estimations: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models; 
- Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and 
three periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-
differences were used in the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was 
used in order to avoid a very high number of instruments; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
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